**Assessing ASEAN’s Role in Mitigating US-China Tensions in the South China Sea**
**Assessing ASEAN’s Role in Mitigating US-China Tensions in the South China Sea**
**Introduction: The Geopolitical Crucible of the South China Sea**
The South China Sea, a strategic maritime corridor through which over $3 trillion of annual trade passes, has become a flashpoint for US-China rivalry. China’s expansive territorial claims, juxtaposed with the US’s advocacy for freedom of navigation, have intensified regional tensions. Amid this, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has sought to position itself as a mediator, balancing its members’ divergent interests while promoting stability. This review evaluates ASEAN’s effectiveness in mitigating superpower tensions, exploring its diplomatic frameworks, challenges, and limitations.
**ASEAN’s Diplomatic Framework and the ‘ASEAN Way’**
Central to ASEAN’s approach is the ‘ASEAN Way’—a consensus-driven model prioritising sovereignty, non-interference, and incremental dialogue. This framework has allowed the bloc to address disputes without escalating confrontations, crucial in managing South China Sea tensions. By avoiding legally binding resolutions and focusing on confidence-building measures, ASEAN has fostered a collaborative environment. However, critics argue that this approach often sacrifices decisive action for harmony, enabling China to exploit divisions. Nonetheless, the ASEAN Way remains pivotal in maintaining a neutral platform for dialogue amid superpower competition.
**Multilateral Forums as Platforms for Dialogue**
ASEAN-led forums, such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and East Asia Summit (EAS), provide structured opportunities for US and Chinese officials to engage. These platforms emphasise inclusive dialogue, allowing ASEAN to steer discussions toward conflict prevention rather than blame. For instance, the 2022 EAS saw ASEAN members urging restraint over Taiwan Strait tensions, indirectly addressing South China Sea anxieties. While such forums lack enforcement mechanisms, they amplify ASEAN’s convening power, ensuring that US-China rivalry does not overshadow regional priorities.
**Pursuit of a Code of Conduct in the South China Sea**
Since 2002, ASEAN and China have intermittently negotiated a Code of Conduct (COC) to establish dispute-resolution protocols. Progress remains sluggish due to China’s reluctance to accept legally binding terms and ASEAN’s internal disagreements. While the Philippines and Vietnam push for a robust COC, Cambodia and Laos often align with Beijing. Despite delays, ASEAN’s persistence keeps the COC on the agenda, preventing unilateral actions from dominating. The COC process underscores ASEAN’s role as a persistent, if imperfect, mediator in institutionalising maritime norms.
**Balancing External Powers: Engagement with the US and China**
ASEAN’s strategy hinges on maintaining equidistant between the US and China. Economically reliant on China and security-dependent on the US, member states avoid overt alignment. Initiatives like the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP) emphasise inclusivity, rejecting exclusionary blocs. By hosting joint military exercises with the US while deepening trade ties with China, ASEAN signals its preference for multilateralism over bipolarity. This balancing act, though precarious, ensures neither superpower feels marginalised, reducing the risk of direct confrontation.
**Internal Divisions and Consensus Challenges**
ASEAN’s effectiveness is hampered by its members’ conflicting interests. Maritime claimants like the Philippines and Vietnam favour stronger US engagement to counterbalance China, while landlocked states such as Laos prioritise Chinese investment. These divergences often lead to watered-down statements, as seen in 2016 when ASEAN omitted references to a Hague ruling against China’s claims. The consensus principle, while fostering unity, frequently results in the lowest common denominator, undermining collective resolve.
**Economic Interdependence as a Stabilising Factor**
ASEAN’s deep economic ties with both the US and China act as a stabilising force. China is ASEAN’s largest trading partner, while the US remains a critical investor. Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) integration reinforces mutual dependencies, incentivising restraint. Economic interdependence creates shared interests in stability, discouraging escalatory actions that could disrupt trade. However, overreliance on Chinese markets also risks coercive leverage, as seen in Beijing’s punitive trade measures against Australia and the Philippines.
**ASEAN’s Limitations in Power Asymmetry**
ASEAN’s influence is constrained by its lack of hard power and institutional fragmentation. Unlike NATO or the EU, it possesses no collective defence mechanism or sanctions toolkit. Consequently, it relies on moral suasion and diplomatic norms, which struggle to counterbalance China’s militarisation of reefs or US freedom of navigation operations. Moreover, ASEAN’s centrality in regional security is increasingly contested, with the US and China pursuing bilateral alliances, such as the AUKUS pact, bypassing ASEAN mechanisms.
**Future Prospects and Strategic Adaptations**
To enhance its role, ASEAN must accelerate COC negotiations, bolster maritime cooperation among members, and strengthen unity. Embracing middle powers like Japan and India could dilute superpower dominance, while investing in a unified stance on international law would enhance credibility. Additionally, ASEAN could leverage its role in climate change and cybersecurity to expand its diplomatic relevance. Without institutional reforms, however, ASEAN risks becoming peripheral in a region increasingly shaped by US-China bipolarity.
**Conclusion: ASEAN as an Imperfect but Indispensable Mediator**
ASEAN’s role in mitigating US-China tensions in the South China Sea is marked by both achievements and constraints. While its consensus model and forums provide essential dialogue channels, internal divisions and power asymmetries limit its efficacy. Nevertheless, ASEAN remains a critical buffer against outright conflict, advocating for multilateralism in an era of strategic rivalry. Its ability to adapt—by fostering cohesion and innovating diplomatic tools—will determine whether it can sustain its relevance as a stabilising force in one of the world’s most contested regions.

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